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I Comments I
About Face: American Ex-POWs Turned
Away by the United States Government;
After Denial of Reparations, What Does the
Future Hold?
Matthew C. Stone
"Sleep my sons, your duty done...
For freedom s light has come.
Sleep in the silent depths of the sea
Or in your bed of hallowed sod
Until you hear at dawn,
The low clear reveille of God."
- Unknown*
I. Introduction
Choosing between competing interests is simply a fact of life for
most politicians. In 1951, President Harry Truman, during his second
presidential term, was faced with such a decision. In an effort to make
the Second World War a thing of the past, rather than a headline topic of
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current events, President Truman signed a document' which since has
been interpreted to have relieved Japan of its obligation to pay repara-
tions to the captured soldiers that were forced to labor at Japanese facili-
ties and in the private mines of several prominent Japanese corporations
during World War 11.2 Almost fifty years later, the prisoners-of-war
("POWs"), who had long ago returned home, were but a few elderly in-
dividuals; yet they would once again rise up to fight. Unlike the first
round, in the swamps and on the beaches of foreign lands, they would
now fight in wood-paneled court rooms and on the floor of the United
States Congress, in their own backyard.
The State of California passed legislation allowing the ex-POWs to
seek reparations, but the law was declared unconstitutional and the door
was slammed shut in the face of our war heroes.3 California, however,
was not alone. Even the federal government made a valiant effort to
provide an avenue for the redress of the forced labor victims. After sur-
passing the two greatest challenges, namely the House and the Senate,
the bill was faced with the threat of a Presidential veto, and soon disap-
peared, leaving the ex-POWs, once again, without repayment for years of
forced labor.4 In the end, the United States government allowed only a
limited time for the soldiers to petition for reparations through a strict
procedure, of which many ex-POWs claim they were never notified. De-
spite having been given a significant amount of property to be liquidated
for payment of reparations by the Japanese government, the United
States government now forbids the ex-POWs from seeking reparations.5
This comment will address the inadequacy of the repayment to these sol-
diers, and the numerous courses of action that could lead to a just future
for America's ex-POWs.
II. History
A. World War II: Events Stemming From the Confrontation on the
Bataan Peninsula in the Philippine Islands.
In 1941, only two years after German tanks forged into Poland,6 Ja-
* The author of the passage is unknown. The quote is inscribed on a monument in
Corregidor, Philippines, that is dedicated to the Pacific War Dead. Every year, on May
6 th, the day that Corregidor fell to the Japanese, sunlight falls directly into the center of
the monument exactly at noon. See Bataan, Corregidor, and the Death March: In Retro-
spect, at http://home.pacbell.net/fbaldie/In_Retrospect.html (last visited May 11, 2003).
1. See infra Sec. 1(B).
2. See infra Sec. II(D)(E) and (F).
3. See infra Sec. II(C) and (D).
4. See infra Sec. II(E).
5. See infra Sec. II(F).
6. RICHARD GOFF ET AL., THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: A BRIEF GLOBAL HISTORY 254
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pan issued The Way of Subjects,7 in which the nation described the China
Affair 8 as "a step toward the construction of a world of moral principals
by Japan." 9 Throughout The Way of Subjects, Japan reiterates a strong
desire for the restoration of world peace, while simultaneously discussing
the need for a national war framework.'0 But Japan's attitude toward
peace would drastically change, as evidenced by the events that took
place on the Bataan peninsula.
On April 9, 1942," in the Bataan Peninsula in the Philippines, Japa-
nese forces captured as many as 78,000 enemy troops,1 2 mostly Ameri-
can and Filipino, 3 who landed there planning to await relief from troops
expected to arrive shortly from Hawaii.14 Because the Japanese had
only expected 40,000 troops to be occupying the peninsula, 5 they were
without sufficient food, water, or transportation for those taken captive in
Bataan.16 The lack of supplies meant a 55-mile, week-long march to the
railroad, 7 which then took the prisoners of war to Camp O'Donnell, a
base that had been converted into a prison camp for the captured sol-
diers. ' 8 The soldiers contracted malaria, 19 dysentery, 20 and beriberi, 2' and
(5th ed., McGraw Hill 1998) (1983).
7. IRwtN HALL AND THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
RIVERSIDE, TWENTIETH CENTURY WORLD CIVILIZATIONS 153 (American Heritage Custom
Publishing 1997) [hereinafter "TWENTIETH CENTURY WORLD CIVILIZATIONS"] acknowl-
edging DAVID JOHN LU, IMPERIAL JAPAN: THE WAY OF SUBJECTS (1974). "The way of
subjects of the Emperor issues from the policy of the Emperor, and is to guard and main-
tain the Imperial Throne coexistent with the Heavens and the Earth.... The life and ac-
tivities of the nation are all attuned to the task of giving great firmness to the foundation
of the Empire." Id.
8. The China Affair was a conflict between Japan and China that began in July,
1937, and consumed enormous Japanese resources. GERHARD L. WEINBERG, A WORLD
AT ARMS: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II 497 (Cambridge University Press 1994)
[hereinafter "A WORLD AT ARMS"].
9. TWENTIETH CENTURY WORLD CIVILIZATIONS, supra note 7, at 155.
10. Id. at 155-56.
11. R.A.C. PARKER, STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL: THE HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD
WAR 92 (Oxford University Press 1989).
12. GERALD ASTOR, THE GREATEST WAR: AMERICANS IN COMBAT 142 (Presidio
Press Inc. 1999) [hereinafter "THE GREATEST WAR: AMERICANS IN COMBAT"]. Other au-
thors contend that the figure was closer to 76,000, but most agree that more than 70,000
troops were captured by the Japanese. See, e.g. SARAH BRASH, THE AMERICAN STORY:
WORLD WAR II 26 (Time Life Books 1997) [hereinafter "THE AMERICAN STORY"].
13. LEN DEIGHTON, BLOOD, TEARS AND FOLLY: AN OBJECTIVE LOOK AT WORLD WAR
II 570-71 (Harper Collins Publishers 1993).
14. A WORLD AT ARMS, supra note 8, at 311.
15. THE GREATEST WAR: AMERICANS IN COMBAT, supra note 12, at 142.
16. Id.
17. MAURICE ISSERMAN, WORLD WAR II: AMERICA AT WAR 46 (Facts On File, Inc.
1991).
18. THE AMERICAN STORY, supra note 12.
19. Malaria is a disease that is caused by a parasitic protozoan called Plasmodium,
which enters the human circulatory system when an infected Anopheles mosquito pierces
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were beaten and robbed, both on their journey to, and after their arrival at
the camp.22 Only 54,000 of the captured soldiers made it to the prison
camps, where another 400 men died each day from starvation, disease,
torture, and executions.23
During the summer of 1942, the Japanese began shipping the re-
maining prisoners from the Philippines to Japan.24 The boats, carrying
only those prisoners fit for manual labor, were labeled "Hell Ships" be-
cause of the deplorable treatment the captives received onboard, on
which 5,000 POWs lost their lives.25 Upon arriving in Japan, the prison-
ers of war were forced to work in mines and factories, replacing Japanese
workers that were being shipped off to war.26 Many of the American
troops worked in foundries, steel plants, and mines, where they were
given only enough food, including monkey and dog meat,27 to ensure that
they would survive to work another day. 28 Some of the workers found
their shortest days lasting 15 hours, leaving little time for their weekly
visit to the 'bathhouse' where everyone bathed at the same time. 29 The
accounts of almost everyone who survived clearly illustrate the inhu-
mane conditions experienced by the prisoners during this grueling period
of forced labor.
In addition to being subjected to forced labor by the Japanese gov-
ernment, the captive soldiers were also sold to Japanese corporations.3°
the skin of the individual in search of blood. The parasitic Plasmodium find their way to
cells in the liver and the lymphatic system and attack red blood cells. The cells are burst
by the parasite and new swarms of the Plasmodium are released and begin seeking other
red blood cells. W. PURVES, ET AL., LIFE: THE SCIENCE OF BIOLOGY 562 (5
th ed. Sinauer
Associates, Inc. 1998) (1983) [hereinafter "THE SCIENCE OF BIOLOGY"].
20. Dysentery is a disorder "marked by inflammation of the intestines, especially of
the colon, and attended by pain in the abdomen, tenesmus, and frequent stools containing
blood and mucus." The disorder is caused by chemical irritants, bacteria, protozoa,
and/or parasitic worms. See, e.g., Galaxy Health Medical Dictionary, at
http://www.galaxyofhealth.com/dictionary/dictionaryd.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
21. Beriberi is a disease that causes extreme weakness. A reduced diet or inadequate
nourishment results in a lack of Vitamin B I, which is a coenzyme in cellular respiration.
The condition causes a loss of appetite and extreme fatigue. THE SCIENCE OF BIOLOGY,
supra note 19, at 892 (Chart 50.2).
22. THE AMERICAN STORY, supra note 12.
23. Id.
24. DONALD KNox, DEATH MARCH: THE SURVIVORS OF BATAAN 337 (Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich Publishers 1981) [hereinafter "DEATH MARCH"].
25. Id. at 337-38.
26. Id. at 359-62.
27. Id. at 368, containing a Recollection of events by Cpl. Ishmael Cox while in a
temporary prisoner camp in Hoten, Manchuria.
28. Id. at 360-62.
29. DEATH MARCH, supra note 24, at 369. Recollection of events by Pfc. William
Wallace while in Niigata.
30. Some individuals have conducted extensive research to determine exactly which
Japanese corporations employed foreign citizens who were captured during the war and
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At the factories and mines of such companies as Mitsubishi, 3 1 Mistu,
Ishihara, 32 and Nippon Steel,33 American soldiers were held captive as
forced laborers.34 The captured soldiers were told to "work or die" de-
spite the fact that some as tall as 6 foot 4 weighed only 95 pounds. Such
conditions led to death rates in Japanese prison camps 30 times higher
than those of German prison camps.35 At the Mitsu corporation, medical
care was very limited 36 because the Japanese required such a rigorous
work schedule.37 Many of the men would remain captive, working un-
bearably long shifts in the mines and plants until the end of the war in
1945." 8
When World War 1I came to a close, 16,000 surviving American
forced to labor. An astonishing 135 such companies have been identified. See Korean
Laborers Sue For WWII Pay, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 28, 200 1, at A8.
31. Mitsubishi Corporation currently has enterprises extending into numerous coun-
tries throughout the world and lists one of its 'Standards of Conduct' as the desire to
"give due consideration to the social impact of its corporate business activities and [to]
always remember that it is an integral part of the communities and international society in
which it operates. . . ." Mitsubishi claims that a Basic Principle of the company is to
"[r]espect human rights .. " See Mitsubishi Corporation's Corporate Profile: "Philoso-
phy and Principles" at http://www.mitsubishi.co.jp/En/corpo/philo/index.html (last vis-
ited May 11, 2003).
32. Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha, Ltd. was founded in September, 1920 and incorporated
in June, 1949. They specialize in chemical engineering and have over 1,400 employees
as of March, 1997. See "About Ishihara Techno Corp." at http://www.iijnet.or.jp/itc-
fmp/company.html (last visited May 11, 2003).
33. Nippon Steel has a history of mergers and divisions that somewhat cloud the past
activities of the company. "The government-owned Yawata Works started operations in
1901, marking the first step in the Japanese steel industry. Japan Iron & Steel Co., Ltd.,
formed with Yawata Works as the nucleus, was split to Yawata and Fuji Steels in 1950
under the Law for the Elimination of Excessive Concentration of Economic Power.
Twenty years later in 1970, the two companies merged again and the present Nippon
Steel Corporation was born." Nippon Steel homepage, at http://www.nsc.co.jp/ (last vis-
ited May 11, 2003).
34. POW Victims of Japanese Slave Labor Testify Before Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, AEROTECH NEWS AND REVIEW: JOURNAL OF AEROSPACE AND DEFENSE INDUSTRY
NEWS, June 30, 2000, available at
http://www.aerotechnews.com/starc/2000/063000/JapanPOWs.html (last visited May
11,2003).
35. Id.
36. See, e.g. Justin Pritchard, US.-Japan Treaty Anniversary Marked, A. P. ONLINE,
Sept. 7, 2001 [hereinafter "US.-Japan Treaty Anniversary Marked']. Part of the article
discusses the experiences of a 6 foot 4 man who weighed only 95 pounds. He was so
weak from the limited diet that he broke one of his frail legs while working in the mines.
Instead of putting a cast on the leg to repair it, a doctor amputated his leg with a hacksaw.
The tourniquet was then packed with maggots to eat away at the gangrenous flesh so that
he might survive to work another day. Id.
37. DEATH MARCH, supra note 24, at 377.
38. L. Ling-chi Wang, No Legacy of Peace: U.S.-Japan Treaty Represents 50 Years
of Denial, S. F. CHRON., Sept. 5, 2001 at A-21. L. Ling-chi Wang is a professor of Asian
American Studies at the University of California at Berkeley, see, e.g., U.S.-Japan Treaty
Anniversary Marked, supra note 36.
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prisoners of war, captured on the peninsula of Bataan, were freed and re-
turned to the United States. 39 Many of the prisoners lost between 6040
and 100 pounds4' during their captivity in Japan, and as one of the 6,000
ex-prisoners still alive today recalls, "[w]e were all just skin and
bones. '" 2  The massive amount of suffering and the vast number of
deaths that took place at the hands of both the Japanese government and
private Japanese corporations are among the worst records of abusive
treatment of POWs in recorded history.43
B. The United States and Japan Sign the 1951 Peace Treaty, Formally
Concluding the War in the Pacific.
Several years later, representatives from Japan, the United States,
and 47 other countries 44 met at the War Memorial Opera House in San
Francisco, California.45 There, on September 8, 1951, during a televised
ceremony, 6 the representatives of the numerous nations signed a peace
treaty 47 formally concluding World War II in the Pacific.48 The treaty
established a defense alliance between the United States and Japan,
which remains a vital part of America's foreign policy, and gave Japan
political independence. 49 Some countries, such as the USSR, Czechoslo-
39. Right of World War II POWs to Sue for Wages: Testimony Before the House Ju-
diciary Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims Regarding HR 1198, 107 th Cong. (Sept.
25, 2002) (Statement of Rep. Dana Rohrabacher) [hereinafter "Right of World War II
POWs to Sue for Wages, Statement of Rep. Dana Rohrabacher"].
40. Edward Klump, Bill Would Let Ex-POWs Sue Japanese Firms, THE ORANGE
CouNTY REG., Mar. 23, 2001 at p-G [hereinafter "Bill Would Let Ex-PO Ws Sue Japanese
Firms ".
41. John A. Patterson, Apologies, Reparations for Bataan, etc. - Hold Japan Ac-
countable for U.S. POWs, PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 13, 2001 at B-6.
42. Bill Would Let Ex-POWs Sue Japanese Firms, supra note 40, at p-G. Quote by
Bowers of Seal Beach, California, a former POW. Bowers was 79 when interviewed.
43. Right of World War H POWs to Sue for Wages, Statement of Rep. Dana Rohra-
bacher, supra note 39.
44. The other attending countries were Argentina, Australia, the Kingdom of Bel-
gium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba,
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guate-
mala, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, the Grand Duchy of
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, the
Kingdom of Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Republic of the Philippines,
Saudi Arabia, Syria, the Republic of Turkey, the Union of South Africa, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Viet Nam.
Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169 [hereinafter "Peace Treaty"].
45. War Legacy Remains Under San Francisco Treaty, JAPAN POL'Y & POL., Sept. 3,
2001 [hereinafter "War Legacy Remains"].
46. Annie Nakao, Gala Reopens Wounds for Japanese Americans, S. F. CHRON.,
Sept. 5, 2001, at A- 1 [hereinafter "Gala Reopens Wounds for Japanese Americans"].
47. Peace Treaty, supra note 44.
48. War Legacy Remains, supra note 45.
49. Bad Feelings Cloud Peace Pact Fest, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Sept. 8,
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vakia, and Poland, elected not to sign the Peace Treaty, 50 and India and
Burma refused to even attend the conference. 51 Japan actually took pro-
active steps to convince some nations to attend the conference and sign
the treaty.
52
The Netherlands was apprehensive about signing the treaty, because
the nation was concerned that it may be interpreted, as it now is, to deny
reparations to the victims of Japanese forced labor practices.53 The Japa-
nese prime minister at the time, Shigeru Yoshida, persuaded the Nether-
lands to sign the treaty by stating that "the government of Japan does not
consider that the government of the Netherlands by signing the treaty has
itself expropriated the private claims of its nationals so that, as a conse-
quence thereof, after the treaty comes into force these claims would be
nonexistent. 54 Thus, as the treaty was being signed, Japan was luring
nations into the treaty with promises that the agreement would not pre-
clude the very action that the U.S. government now prohibits: repara-
tions suits by private individuals. This Multilateral Treaty of Peace with
Japan, as well as a Security Treaty between the United States and Ja-
pan,55 took effect on April 28, 1952.
The treaty contained several noteworthy provisions, two of which
are found in Article 14. First, Japan recognized that it should pay repara-
tions.56 Second, except for territories which Japanese troops occupied
during the war, the Allied powers waived all reparations claims against
Japan.57 Such provisions have been interpreted as absolving Japan of
any obligation to pay reparations, allowing the country to realize sub-
stantial economic benefits.58 Just five years later, in 1956, Japan became
2001, at 16-A.
50. See, e.g., History Central Timeline, at http://www.multied.com/dates/1950.html
(last visited May 11, 2003).
51. See Chronology of Japan: Timeline, at
http://www.ghazali.net/world/japan/html/body_1951_-_2000_ad.html (last visited May
11,2003).
52. Steven C. Clemons, US. Role in Japanese Amnesia, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC
REvIEW, Oct. 25, 2001, at 32.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Security Treaty with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, U.S.-Japan, 3 U.S.T. 3329.
56. Peace Treaty, supra note 44, at ch. 5, art. 14(a). "It is recognized that Japan
should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it
during the war .. " Id.
57. Id. at ch. 5, art. 14(b). "Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the
Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Al-
lied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals
in the course of the prosecution of the war .... Id.
58. Mark Magnier, The World 50 Years Later, Japan Finds Peace and Uncertainty
Treaty: The Nation Rose After World War H to be a Major Economic Player, But the
Past Decade Has Seen a Slump. Many Wonder When it Will End, L. A. TIMES, Sept. 8,
2001 at A5 [hereinafter "The World 50 Years Later"].
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a member of the United Nations, and later became the world's second
largest economy.59
C. The State of California Enacts a Law Giving Ex-POWs the Right to
Sue Japanese Corporations to Recover Reparations for Their
Imprisonment.
In 1999, the State of California passed a statute60 which recognized
individual claims by ex-POWs that were held captive as forced laborers
during World War II against the multi-national corporations that en-
slaved them.6' The law allowed not only the ex-prisoners themselves,
but also the heirs of the victims, to sue, in California state courts, the
firms that used the soldiers as forced labor.62 Mike Honda, a co-author
of the law and then a State Representative in the California Legislature,
reasoned that "[i]n this country, people have the right to have their day in
court," describing the right as "a guarantee." 63 The California statute,
which extended the deadline for filing claims until 2010, opened the door
to reparations suits by those held captive as prisoners in Japan, Germany,
and their allies, which would otherwise be barred by the statute of limita-
tions.64 Many suits that otherwise would not have been filed were per-
mitted by the statute in the State of California, which became "a spear-
head in an international campaign to confront Japan over its wartime
,,65sins.
D. Conflict: The Federal Government Prepares to Do Battle With the
State of California.
After the enactment of California Code of Civil Procedure § 354.6,
numerous suits 66 were filed in state courts by former POWs held captive
by the Japanese and forced to work for Japanese Corporations.67 The
59. Id.
60. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 354.6 (1999) "Second World War slave forced labor
victims; heirs; actions for recovery of compensation; limitations."
61. U.S. Rejects Basis for Wartime Compensation Suits, JAPAN POL'Y & POL., Sept.
10, 2001 [hereinafter "U.S. Rejects Basis"].
62. Mark Austin, War Not Over for Ex-POWs Suing Japanese Firms, THE YOMiURI
SHIMBUN, Sept. 1, 2001.
63. Id.
64. U.S. Congressmen Push Bill For Ex-POWs Against Japanese Firms, JAPAN
POL'Y & POL., Mar. 26, 2001.
65. Charles Burress, State is Ground Zero for WWI] Lawsuits: California Lets Ex-
POWs Take Aim at Japan, S. F. CHRON., Apr. 22. 2001, at A1.
66. To date, there have been 26 such cases filed in the United States. This number is
expected to increase significantly in the future. See, e.g., The Center for Internee Rights,
Inc. homepage, at http://www.expows.com/ (last visited May 11, 2003).
67. U.S. Rejects Basis, supra note 61.
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federal government almost immediately intervened in many of those
suits. 68 One POW filed suit against a Japanese Corporation less then one
month after the California Legislature enacted the statute.69 His claims
were consolidated into a class action lawsuit after he was joined by six
other ex-POWs, and the State Department submitted a "Statement of In-
terest" arguing that the case should be thrown out.70 U.S. District Court
Judge Vaughn R. Walker acknowledged the existence of removal juris-
diction.71 Despite plaintiffs' attempts to argue only state law, the judge
held that the claims implicated the federal common law of foreign rela-
tions which thereby gave rise to federal jurisdiction.72 He went on to
dismiss the claims, holding that, "the 1951 Treaty constitute[d] a waiver
of the instant claims. 73
Similarly, almost a year later, before the same judge, several Fili-
pino ex-POWs brought suit against the same Japanese Corporations, in
part based on the same California state law.74 While many of the claims
made by the Filipino plaintiffs closely mirrored those of the previous
litigation, they also asserted that the court had jurisdiction to hear their
claims, as opposed to those of the American ex-POWs, under the Alien
Tort Claims Act.7 5 The Act provides federal district courts with original
jurisdiction over claims by aliens for torts committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States. 76 Judge Walker remained
unconvinced however, holding that "the [Alien Tort Claims Act] may
enable [the] court to hear the Filipino plaintiffs' claims, but it does not
eliminate the preclusive effect of the [1951 Peace Treaty]. 77
In a decision handed down the same day, Chinese and Korean na-
tionals, who were victims of Japanese forced labor practices during
World War II, had their claims dismissed based on the same reasoning
68. Mark Austin, War Not Over for U.S. Ex-POWs Suing Japan Firms, THE
YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Sept. 1, 2001.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Defendants are permitted to remove to federal court "any civil action brought in
a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction."
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994).
72. In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 114 F.Supp. 2d 939,
942-43 (N.D. Cal 2000),judgment affirmed by Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 317 F.3d 1005
( 9 th Cir. 2003), opinion amended and superceded on denial of rehearing by Deutsch v.
Turner Corp., 324 F.3d. 692 (9th Cir. 2003).
73. 114 F.Supp. 2d at 948.
74. In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 164 F.Supp. 2d 1153
(N.D. Cal 2001),judgment affirmed by Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 317 F.3d 1005 (9 th Cir.
2003), opinion amended and superceded on denial of rehearing by Deutsch v. Turner
Corp., 324 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2003).
75. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993).
76. 164 F.Supp. 2d at 1159.
77. Id. at 1159-60.
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used against the Filipino plaintiffs. 78 Judge Walker struck down as un-
constitutional the 1999 California state law allowing such suits, holding
that the law "infringe[d] on the federal government's exclusive powers
over foreign affairs., 79 The court reasoned that without the California
state law, which had been declared unconstitutional, the plaintiffs' claims
were time-barred, and therefore were dismissed.
80
On January 21, 2003, the 9 th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
court's decision that the California law81 was unconstitutional.8 2 The 9
Circuit held that the 1999 California statute violated the foreign affairs
doctrine and that because the statute did not provide an avenue for relief,
the claims of the ex-POWs were barred by the statute of limitations.
8 3
The appellate court confirmed the reasoning of the U.S. District Court
Judge, stating that the law allowing the ex-POWs to sue was contrary to
U.S. foreign policy and that the 1951 Peace Treaty prevented the soldiers
from seeking restitution. 84 But as Joseph Cotchett, attorney for the ex-
POWs, tried to explain, "These people were enslaved by multinational
corporations. This has nothing to do with foreign policy. '8 5
E. Congress Contends that Article 26 of the Peace Treaty Has Been
Invoked, Authorizing House Resolution 1198, Which Allows Ex-
POWs to Sue in Federal Court for Reparations From the Japanese
Corporations That Employed Them as Forced Laborers.
Article 26 of the 1951 Peace Treaty with Japan states that "[s]hould
Japan make a peace settlement or war claims settlement with any State
granting that State greater advantages than those provided by the present
Treaty, those same advantages shall be extended to the parties of the pre-
sent Treaty."8 6 Since the Peace Treaty went into effect, Japan has en-
tered into other treaties with numerous nations, including South Korea,
the Soviet Union, Denmark, Sweden, Spain, and Switzerland.8 7 Debates
78. In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 164 F.Supp. 2d 1160
(N.D. Cal 200 1),judgment affirmed by Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 317 F.3d 1005 (9
th Cir.
2003), opinion amended and superceded on denial of rehearing by Deutsch v. Turner
Corp., 324 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2003).
79. K. Connie Kang, Law Allowing Suits by Forced Laborers Voided Court: A Judge
Rules That the State Measure on WWII Redress Violates the Constitution, L. A. TIMES,
Sept. 20, 2001.
80. 164 F.Supp. 2d at 1182-83.
81. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 354.6 (1999).
82. Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 317 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2003).
83. Id.
84. Court Says Ex-POWs Can't Sue, TIMES UNION, Jan. 22, 2003.
85. Id.
86. Peace Treaty, supra note 44, at ch. 7, art. 26.
87. See, generally, Right of World War IPOWs to Sue for Wages: Testimony Before
the House Judiciary Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims Regarding HR 1198, 1 0 7th
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ensued among many politicians as to the language of the 1951 Peace
Treaty and what exactly constituted "greater advantages." The more re-
cent treaties signed by Japan were carefully scrutinized to determine
whether the language of those treaties, and the benefits conferred therein,
triggered the Article 26 provisions of the 1951 Peace Treaty.
Congress believed that the subsequent actions of Japan gave the
United States the right to seek the same advantages, and therefore drafted
H.R. 1198, the "Justice for United States Prisoners of War Act of 2001."
Proponents of H.R. 1198 asserted that Japan's war claims settlements,
established after signing the 1951 Peace Treaty, permitted the citizens of
several other countries to sue Japanese nationals without restriction or
waiver.88 This is the very same privilege that American soldiers were
denied by the 1951 Peace Treaty. Thus, it was argued, the provisions of
Article 26 had been invoked, entitling American citizens, who were used
as forced laborers by the Japanese, to sue for reparations in federal
courts. 89 The House Resolution itself stated that the "Government of Ja-
pan... entered into war claims settlement agreements with other coun-
tries that provide[d] terms more beneficial .. . with respect to claims by
nationals of those countries."
90
Congressional opponents to the bill argued that such an assertion
was incorrect, and that the reason such other treaties were not cited in the
resolution was because no such treaties existed. 91 The opposition cited
their own examples of treaties in order to demonstrate that Article 26 had
not been implicated, claiming that agreements made between Japan and
other countries, such as Burma and Indonesia, actually used the exact
same language found in Article 14(b) of the 1951 Peace Treaty, and that,
therefore, there could be no "greater advantages" conferred in such
agreements.92
Despite the objections raised by some members of Congress, The
House of Representatives voted on the resolution in July, 2001, and
overwhelmingly approved the measure by a vote of 395 to 33.93 As the
bill headed to the Senate, President George W. Bush indicated that he
would veto the measure, notwithstanding the fact that the bill had been
Cong. (Sept. 25, 2002) (statement of Robert D. McCallum, Jr. Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Civil Division) [hereinafter "Right of World War 11 POWs to Sue for Wages, Testi-
mony of Robert D. McCallum, Assistant Attorney General"].
88. Right of World War H POWs to Sue for Wages, Statement of Rep. Dana Rohra-
bacher, supra note 39.
89. Id.
90. Right of World War H POWs to Sue for Wages, Statement of Robert D.
McCallum, Assistant Attorney General, supra note 87 (citing H.R. 1198 Sec. 2(6)).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. POWs' Right to Sue Affirmed by Senate, THE WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 11, 2001
at A06 [hereinafter "PO Ws 'Right to Sue Affirmed by Senate"].
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introduced in the House of Representatives by congressmen from both
94the Republican and Democratic parties. Nonetheless, the Senate ap-
proved the bill by a vote of 58 to 34 on September 10, 2001, just two
days after the 5 0th anniversary of the signing of the Peace Treaty in San
Francisco. 95 The approved bill essentially prevented the federal govern-
ment, specifically the State Department and the Department of Justice,
from spending any funds in an effort to oppose a civil suit filed by a
World War II POW against Japanese Corporations. 96  The ex-POWs
were happy to hear about the proposed legislation, as evidenced by one
individual who said, "I am glad that my tax money can no longer be used
to fight me."97
With the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,98 the perfect ar-
gument against H.R. 1198 landed squarely in the President's lap. The
federal government argued that enacting such legislation would be harm-
ful to the war on terrorism by creating tension between the United States
and Japan, a key ally in the fight against terrorism.99 In addition, several
former U.S. ambassadors to Japan began voicing their opposition to the
bill, arguing that such legislation would directly contradict the 1951
Peace Treaty, would permanently scar relations with Japan, and would
bring the durability of other U.S. treaties into question.100 The same
Congress that had already voted on and approved H.R. 1198 agreed to
remove it from the spending bill. President Bush then signed the appro-
priations bill into law on November 28, 2001, without giving ex-POWs
the right to sue Japanese Corporations.10 1 Supporters of the bill were left
in disbelief, having just learned a valuable lesson in politics: "Even what
some call a righteous and sensible idea with bipartisan backing can run
94. Bush to Veto Bill for Backing POW Suits Against Japan, JilJ PRESS ENGLISH
NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 31, 2001.
95. POWs' Right to Sue Affirmed by Senate, supra note 93, at A06.
96. Id.
97. Quoting ex-POW Lester Tenney of La Jolla, California who survived the Bataan
Death March and is among those who sued Japanese corporations seeking compensation.
Richard Simon, Senate Bill Would Aid Ex-WWII POWs' Suits Reparations: Measure
Bars Justice, State From Funding Opposition to Slave-Labor Complaints Against Japa-
nese Firms, L. A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2001, at A9 [hereinafter "Senate Bill Would Aid Ex-
WWI POWs' Suits"].
98. On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked four commercial airliners loaded with
passengers and crashed two of the planes into the World Trade Center towers in New
York City. Another jet was flown into the Pentagon and a fourth crashed, due to an on-
board struggle, in Pennsylvania. Richard Willing and Jim Drinkard, U.S. under attack,
USA TODAY, Sept. 12, 2001, at AO1.
99. U.S. Congress Drops WWII Forced Labor Provision, JAPAN POL'Y & POL., Dec.
3, 2001 [hereinafter "US. Congress Drops WWII Provision"].
100. Edward Epstein, Ex-POWs Fight for Right to Sue Japanese Companies, U.S. Say
Rights Were Waived in '51 Pact, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 25, 2002, at A.2 [hereinafter "Ex-
POWs Fight for Right to Sue Japanese Companies"].
101. U.S. Congress Drops WWII Provision, supra note 99.
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up against unyielding opposition from powerful interests."
10 2
F. The Federal Government Will Not Allow Ex-PO Ws to Sue for
Reparations, but The Peace Treaty of 1951 Gave the Federal
Government the Authority to Acquire Property From Japan in Order
to Pay Such Reparations.... So Where's the Money?
Another key provision of the 1951 Peace Treaty 10 3 gave the Allied
Powers the right to seize nearly $4 billion' 0 4 worth of Japanese assets and
dispose of them in exchange for the clause in the treaty waiving the
rights of prisoners to sue Japanese Corporations.10 5 The burden was then
on the nation seizing the property to use the proceeds as reparations for
the victims of forced labor.'0 6 In the United States, individuals held as
prisoners by the Japanese government or Japanese Corporations were
eligible to receive payments from a "War Claims Fund," which was es-
tablished by the federal government pursuant to the War Claims Act.
10 7
The War Claims Commission ("the Commission") 08 established a fund
and was to use payments to compensate entitled individuals.'0 9
The next step, however, in issuing such payments, would be to no-
tify the ex-POWs of their ability to request such reparations. In one
reparations suit, California Superior Court Judge Kathleen 0' Leary in-
quired about the notice procedure: "They come home in 1946 and in
102. Ex-POWs Fight for Right to Sue Japanese Companies, supra note 100.
103. Peace Treaty, supra note 44, at ch. 5, art. 14(a)(2). "... each of the Allied Pow-
ers shall have the right to seize, retain, liquidate or otherwise dispose of all property,
rights and interests of (a) Japan and Japanese nationals, (b) persons acting for or on be-
half of Japan or Japanese nationals .. " Id.
104. The actual amount derived from the property is in dispute. The FCSC contends
that the actual amount received was only $228,750,000. See, e.g., War Claims and En-
emy Property Legislation: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Commerce and Fi-
nance, 8 6th Cong. (first session) (Statement by Whitney Gillilland, then head of the For-
eign Claims Settlement Commission) [hereinafter "War Claims and Enemy Property
Legislation, Statement by Whitney Gillilland, then head of the Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission"].
105. Right of World War 1I POWs to Sue for Wages, Statement of Robert D.
McCallum, Assistant Attorney General, supra note 87.
106. Id.
107. War Claims Act, 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 2005, et. seq. (1990).
108. The War Claims Commission merged with the International Claims Commission
in 1954 to form the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission ("FCSC") which is an inde-
pendent agency within the Department of Justice. The FCSC and its predecessor agen-
cies claim to have successfully completed 43 claims programs to resolve claims against
various countries including the Federal Republic of Germany, Iran, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria,
Romania, Hungary, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Italy, Cuba, China, East
Germany, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Egypt, Panama, and Albania. Of substantial interest is the
fact that Japan does not appear on the list. See War Claims Commission homepage, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/fcsc/ (last visited May 11, 2003).
109. Right of World War II POWs to Sue for Wages, Statement of Robert D.
McCallum, Assistant Attorney General, supra note 87.
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1951 they have [the] right to the claims.... Were they notified they had
this right?"" 0 The federal attorney appearing for the government in the
case could not explain the methods used, or lack thereof, to inform the
soldiers of their right to request reparations from the fund, but one ex-
prisoner, Carlos Montoya,"' said that he never heard from anyone about
any reparations fund: "We came back in 1945 and here it is 2002, and
I've never heard that. Not once."
' 12
On the other hand, the Commission claims to have gone to great
lengths to notify the ex-POWs of their right to reparations. The Com-
mission alleges that they sent letters to members of Congress, the direc-
tors of several major veterans' organizations, the governor of each State,
each member of every State Legislature that was then in session, weekly
newspapers, and radio stations. 113 They reported mailing a total of
35,426 letters and recording 8,286 column inches of war claims items in
newspapers across the country between January 20, 1950, and February
28, 1951.114 But while the Commission is confident that its efforts were
adequate, some organizations, such as the National American Ex-POWs
Association, Inc., and the Center for Internee Rights, Inc., argue that the
effort expended by the Commission to find and notify potential claimants
was insufficient."
15
One reason that relatively few claims were made for reparations
from the fund may be the perceived inadequacy of the compensation.
Prior to 1952, the maximum recoverable amount under The War Claims
Act was $1.00 per day, which amounts to less than $2,000 for an ex-
POW forced to work in mines or factories as forced labor for Japanese
Corporations, up to fifteen hours per day, for five years." 6 After 1952,
The War Claims Act was amended, but still only allowed a maximum
recovery of $2.50 per day of imprisonment, and the amount was still lim-
ited to $1.00 per day unless the individual could demonstrate that he was
subjected to "inhumane treatment." ' 1 7 Even adjusting for inflation, such
110. Chelsea J. Carter, Feds Argue Against Suits by POWs, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS,
July 11, 2002, at A-1I [hereinafter "Feds Argue Against Suits by POWs"].
111. Carlos Montoya, 87 when interviewed, is an ex-POW who resides in San Diego,
California. Id.
112. Id.
113. Semi-Annual Report to the Congress from the War Claims Commission for the
Period Ending March 13, 1951, War Claims Commission, at 14.
114. Id.
115. Gary K. Reynolds, CRS Report for Congress: U.S. Prisoners of War and Civil-
ian American Citizens Captured and Interned by Japan in World War 11: The Issue of
Compensation by Japan, Updated July 27, 2001, at CRS-9.
116. LEON FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 488-522 (Ran-
dom House 1972).
117. An Act to Amend Sections 6 and 7 of the War Claims Act of 1948, Ch. 167, 66
Stat. 47.
[Vol. 22:1
ABOUT FACE: AMERICAN Ex-POWS TURNED AWAY
a nominal amount hardly can be considered adequate repayment of Ja-
pan's indebtedness to the soldiers.
Despite opening up the reparations fund to not only the POWs, but
also to civilian internees,' 18 American merchant seamen, interned civilian
contractor employees, 19 and Guamanians captured by the Japanese, the
total amount reportedly awarded on claims made by those eligible was
still only $141,951,492.120 Even if the Commission only received
$228,750,000 from the liquidation of seized Japanese assets,'12
$86,798,508 should still be available to potential claimants. And if the
sale of the Japanese assets generated $4 billion, as some argue, then as
much as $3,858,048,508 should be left to compensate the ex-POWs.
122
When between $86 million and $3.8 billion remains in a reparations
fund for ex-POWs taken captive by Japan, why are individuals suing
Japanese Corporations if they could simply make a claim to the Commis-
sion for an award? The simple answer is because they can't. The POWs
were permitted to petition for an award of $1.00 per day from January
30, 1950, through March 31, 1951, and any claims made after that lim-
ited period were regarded as untimely.' 23 Similarly, requests for the ad-
ditional $1.50 per day for forced labor were accepted from April 9, 1952,
through August 1, 1954.124 Thus, not only were the prisoners allowed a
very limited period of time in which to seek these meager reparations,
but the two periods did not overlap, therefore requiring multiple efforts
by the ex-POWs to traverse the hierarchy of the federal government.
118. Civilian internees interned or in hiding were entitled to $60 per day, an amount
far in excess of that attainable by the forced labor victims. See, e.g., The 1998 Annual
Report of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, at 68-69 [hereinafter "1998 FCSC
Report"].
119. Interned civilian contractor employees were entitled to $60 per day, an amount
far in excess of that attainable by the forced labor victims. See, id.
120. Id.
121. The FCSC contends that the amount received from the sale of Japanese assets
was only $228,750,000. See, e.g., War Claims and Enemy Property Legislation, State-
ments by Whitney Gillilland, then head of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission,
supra note 104.
122. Some argue that the amount realized from the liquidation of seized Japanese as-
sets was actually $4 billion. $4 billion less the $141,951,491 paid out as awards on
claims leaves a total of $3,858,048,508 remaining in the reparations fund. See, e.g., Right
of World War H POWs to Sue for Wages, Testimony of Robert D. McCallum, Assistant
Attorney General, supra note 87.
123. 1998 FCSC Report, supra note 118, at 69.
124. Id. at 68-69.
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III. Was the Court's Decision to Deny Reparations Justified? 25
A. Japan's other deals: Invocation ofArticle 26 of the 1951 Peace
Treaty.
In 1951, Japan signed the Peace Treaty and agreed that if, at any
time, greater benefits were conferred on the citizens of another nation,
those same benefits would be conferred on the citizens of the nations that
were signatories to the 1951 Peace Treaty.' 26 Since then, Japan has en-
tered into such treaties with Burma, Switzerland, Indonesia, the Philip-
pines, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands, Spain,
127 Vietnam, Denmark, 128
Sweden, 129 and Korea. 130 According to Article 26, only one treaty con-
ferring greater advantages on the citizens of that nation by Japan is
needed to justify extending greater benefits to the American ex-POWs.
By the terms of the 1951 Peace Treaty, Japan permitted the United
States government to seize certain limited property in Japan in order to
pay reparations,' 3' but in exchange, the Japanese government required
the release of all claims against Japanese nationals by the citizens of the
United States. 132  When Japan entered into a somewhat similar treaty
with Denmark in 1959, Japan agreed not only to allow the seizure of
property to pay reparations, but actually agreed to make payments for
125. The line of cases will not be discussed in great detail, because the focus of this
comment is to simply provide enough background facts to lay the foundation for a de-
tailed analysis of the options available for reconciliation of this ongoing dispute. A more
detailed analysis of the relevant line of cases can be found in several commendable arti-
cles. See Jennifer Joseph, POWs Left in the Cold: Compensation Eludes American WWII
Slave Laborers for Private Japanese Companies, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 209 (2001); Karolyn
A. Eilers, Article 14(b) of the 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan: Interpretation and Ef-
fects on POWs' Claims Against Japanese Corporations; 11 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 469 (2001); Curtis A. Bradley, World War II Compensation and Foreign Rela-
tions Federalism, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 282 (2002); Russell A. Miller, Much Ado, But
Nothing: California 's New World War H Slave Labor Law Statute of Limitations and its
Place in the Increasingly Futile Effort to Obtain Compensation from American Courts,
23 WHITTIERL. REV. 121 (2001).
126. Peace Treaty, supra note 44, at ch. 7, art. 26.
127. Exchange of Note Constituting an Agreement Regarding the Settlement of the
Problem Concerning Certain Types of Spanish Claims, Jan. 8, 1957, Japan-Spain.
128. Arrangement Regarding Settlement of Certain Danish Claims, May 25, 1959,
Japan-Den.
129. Arrangement Regarding Settlement of Certain Swedish Claims, Sept. 20, 1957,
Japan-Swed.
130. Commerce-Justice-State Appropriations/Day in Court For POWs: Senate Re-
cord Vote Analysis of H.R. 2500, 10 7th Cong. (Sept. 10, 2001) available at
http://www.senate.gov/-rpc/rva /1071/1071276.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2002).
131. See Sec. II(F).
132. Peace Treaty, supra note 44, at ch. 5, art. 14(b) ... the Allied Powers waive
all.., other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions
taken by Japan and its nationals..." Id.
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claims for injury to the Danish nationals. Japan did not require Demark
to make the same concessions the United States made in the 1951 Peace
Treaty. In particular, Japan did not require Denmark to agree to release
any claims against Japanese nationals133 as was required by the 1951
Peace Treaty. Thus, even if the United States and Denmark received the
same settlement value from the respective treaties, the United States was
required to give up something that Denmark was permitted to retain: the
right to sue. Two nations, paying a different price for essentially the
same benefit, cannot logically be concluded to have received the same
deal. In this case, Denmark clearly had the "greater advantage" and
thereby implicated Article 26 of the 1951 Peace Treaty. Under Article
26, when such "greater advantages" are conferred upon another nation,
"those same advantages shall be extended to the parties" of the 1951
Peace Treaty. 134 Denmark has retained the exact right that American
citizens have been seeking: the right to sue.
A similar argument can be made for the treaty between Japan and
the Soviet Union. While the two countries changed the language in an
effort to mask their activities, the practical effects of the agreement are
the same as those that Denmark received: the signing nation's citizens
retained the right to sue. Japan did include in the treaty with the Soviet
Union a release of claims provision, but it was not absolute. The Soviet
Union only was required to agree to release all claims that stemmed from
events taking place after August 9, 1945.135 Such a large window of op-
portunity was not offered to the citizens of the United States. When the
U.S. signed the 1951 Peace Treaty, it was a complete and total waiver of
claims, subject to Article 26, regardless of the time at which the claim
arose. 1 36 So while the United States gave up all claims, the Soviet Union
only gave up some; those arising after August 9, 1945. This, once again,
can only be characterized as a "greater advantage" being given to another
nation than was received in the 1951 Peace Treaty.
Thus, according to the plain language of Article 26, the United
States is entitled to the same benefit: the right to sue on claims stemming
from events taking place before August 9, 1945. The American and Al-
lied soldiers were captured at Bataan in 1942 and subjected to forced la-
bor far before 1945. If the United States were granted the same benefit
133. See, e.g., Statement of Professor Harold G. Maier before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, June 28, 2000, available at
http://www.gainfo.org/SFPT/ExpertWitnessOnSFPTSenateJudiciaryComm28June2000.h
tm (last visited May 11, 2003) [hereinafter "Statement of Professor Harold G. Maier be-
fore the Senate Judiciary Committee"].
134. Peace Treaty, supra note 44, at ch. 7, art. 26.
135. Statement of Professor Harold G. Maier before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
supra note 133.
136. See Peace Treaty, supra note 44, at ch. 5, art. 14.
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that was conferred in Japan's treaty with the Soviet Union, any ex-POWs
that are citizens of any of the 48 countries that signed the 1951 Peace
Treaty with Japan should be permitted under Article 26 to pursue their
claims against the government, nationals, and corporations of Japan.
B. Worldwide Demand. Global Desire for Justice, Reparations, and
Apology from Japan.
When members of a family, a community, and a nation are sub-
jected to the kind of gruesome and deplorable treatment that prisoners-
of-war were subjected to in Japan, no one is quick to forget. Half a cen-
tury after the atrocities, in a new millennium, there is still an astonishing
worldwide demand for a legitimate Japanese apology and for the pay-
ment of reparations to those individuals through whom the corporations,
and the government of Japan, were unjustly enriched.
Every month, members of the Dutch Japanese Honorary Debt
Foundation demonstrate in front of the Japanese Embassy and have even
filed lawsuits, not in the United States, but in Tokyo's District Court.
1 37
In 2000, the Legislative Counsel of Hong Kong approved a motion de-
manding an apology from Japan.' 38 When Emporer Akihito of Japan vis-
ited Great Britain in 1997, hundreds of British civilians and ex-POWs
demonstrated, turning their backs as he passed, 39 performing an appro-
priate about face. All this is in addition to the abundance of action taken
by the United States Congress. Besides the House Resolutions seeking
reparations from Japan, already herein mentioned, another bill, House
Resolution 126, specifically demanded that Japan "formally issue a clear
and unambiguous apology for the atrocious war crimes committed by the
Japanese military during World War II.,,140
Even the citizens of Japan have begun arguing that their government
should pay reparations for its wartime activities. More and more Japa-
nese citizens are demanding that their government make amends for the
atrocities of World War 11.141 At a minimum, many Japanese believe that
137. Has Japan Offered an Apology for its War Crimes of the 2 0 th Century?, Global
Alliance for Preserving the History of WWII in Asia, available at
http://www.gainfo.org/SFPT/SFPTApology.htm (last visited May 11, 2003) [hereinafter
"Has Japan Offered an Apology?"]. The case was filed in 1995 and reported to have
risen to the appellate level. See, e.g., The Center for Internee Rights, Inc. homepage, at
http://www.expows.com/ (last visited May 11, 2003), supra note 66.
138. Has Japan Offered an Apology?, supra note 137.
139. Id.
140. Expressing the Sense of Congress Concerning the War Crimes Committed by the
Japanese Military During World War II, H.R. 126, 105 'h Cong., submitted by Mr. Lipin-
ski, available at http://www.gainfo.org/SFPT/HCR126.htm (last visited May 11, 2003);
See also, Has Japan Offered an Apology?, supra note 137.
141. Process of Atonement, SOUTH CHINA MORNING PRESS, Aug. 28, 2002, at 15
[hereinafter "Process of Atonement"].
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their government should apologize. 142 Each year, numerous nations en-
courage the Japanese government to make amends for the actions taken
during World War II by means of an apology.1
43
C. What Others Have Done: When Citizens of Other Countries Rise
Up and Demand Reparations From Those That Enslaved Them,
Those Seeking Compensation Have Been Fairly Successful.
The Australian government, which signed the 1951 Peace Treaty,
recently heard almost the same exact challenge that the United States
government addressed just a short time ago. Citizens that were forced
into slave labor during World War II by the Japanese government and
private Japanese Corporations demanded an apology and the payment of
reparations. 144 After an investigation of the matter, Rusty Priest, 145 act-
ing National President of the Returned and Services League for Austra-
lia, determined that the Japanese government could not be forced to
compensate the war victims because such reparations were precluded by
the 1951 Peace Treaty. 146 The Australian government, in order to ad-
dress competing interests, chose to pay reparations itself, and distributed
over $247 million in Australian currency 147 to not only the ex-prisoners
themselves, but also to widows of victims and non-military civil detain-
ees. 148  Australia's Treasurer, Peter Costello, said that no amount of
compensation could redress the pain and suffering of the POWs, and
Rusty Priest acknowledged that those captured at Bataan and enslaved by
Japan were a "special case," deserving of such compensation. 49 But
even some of the ex-POWs that received compensation are not entirely
satisfied, as demonstrated by one ex-POW who said that "the Australian
taxpayer is paying what the Japanese government should be paying."',
50
The amount received by the Australians pales in comparison to that
142. Id.
143. Mari Yamaguchi, Japan to Mark World War H Bombings, THE ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Aug. 5, 2002.
144. Australian POWs Welcome Compensation But Want Japanese Apology, THE
CANADIAN PRESS, May 23, 2001 [hereinafter "Australian POWs Welcome Compensa-
tion"].
145. Rusty Priest was the Acting National President of the Returned and Services
League for Australia during the period when this matter was addressed. See, id.
146. Id.
147. The amount distributed, $247,875,000 in Australian currency, is approximately
equal to $159,829,552 in United States currency (as of May 11, 2003) based on the ex-
change rate: 1 Australian Dollar = 0.644799 U.S. Currency. See, e.g., Exchange Rate
Information at http://www.x-rates.com/d/AUD/table.html (last visited May 11, 2003).
148. Australian POWs Welcome Compensation, supra note 144.
149. Id.
150. Quote from David Barrett, 79 when quoted, who spent over three years as a
POW in Thailand. See id.
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collected by the victims of slave labor during the Nazi Era. The German
government and several German corporations entered into an agreement
with the United States whereby they approved provisions requiring them
to pay $5 billion' 5' to'establish a fund which would provide compensa-
tion for the slave laborers who worked in concentration camps and Ger-
man factories. 52 In exchange for the establishment of the reparations
fund, President Bill Clinton agreed that the United States government
would do everything in its power to prevent private lawsuits by U.S. citi-
zens against German corporations for reparations. 153 This is dramatically
different than the situation between the United States and Japan, where
the federal government is attempting to prevent such lawsuits, in spite of
a lack of repayment, rather than in exchange for such a compensatory
disbursement. In addressing the agreement between the U.S. and Ger-
many, the United States Deputy Secretary of Treasury, Stuart E. Eizen-
stat, who led negotiations on behalf of the United States, said, "This fills
a void that has existed for 55 years .... This had never been dealt with.
It had fallen off the agenda."' 5 4 These words explain in hindsight what is
still true with regard to Japan: forced labor victims are entitled to com-
pensation for their suffering throughout World War II.
Even the United States is not entirely opposed to the concept of
reparations. After the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, national panic en-
sued, which resulted in the incarceration of thousands of Japanese, the
majority of whom were American citizens.' 55 Almost 5,000 Japanese
were taken from the city of San Francisco, California, alone.' 56 At the
time, the U.S. government perceived these individuals as a threat to secu-
rity, 157 but later the United States gave $1.2 billion' 58 to the Japanese-
Americans that were held captive.' 59 Thus, the United States government
is willing to pay reparations, but will not allow American citizens to seek
151. The German government and German Corporations agreed to contribute equally.
See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Germans Sign Agreement to Pay Forced Laborers of Nazi
Era, July 18, 2000, N. Y. TIMES, at A-3 [hereinafter "Germans Sign Agreement to Pay
Forced Laborers"]. The German businesses that were party to the agreement came up
with $2.55 billion Euros (approximately $2.39 billion U.S. dollars). See, e.g., German
Industry Comes Up With Full 2.5 Billion Euros for Nazi Slave Fund, AGENCE FR.-
PRESSE, Mar. 13, 2001.
152. Germans Sign Agreement to Pay Forced Laborers, supra note 151.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Gala Reopens Wounds for Japanese Americans, supra note 46.
156. Id.
157. Dick Snider, Should U.S. Pay Reparations to Slave Descendants?, TOPEKA CAP.
J., Sept. 10, 2001, at A4.
158. The $1.2 billion was paid to approximately 60,000 individuals, which means that
each individual received about $20,000. See Ronald Roach, Moving Towards Repara-
tions, BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION, Nov. 8, 2001.
159. See id.
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those reparations from foreign nations or the companies primarily lo-
cated therein. This leaves few avenues of relief for the ex-POWs.
D. Unbiased View: Without the Federal Government Influencing
Federal Courts, What Might the Outcome Have Been,; What Have
U.S. State Courts Done?
In the In Re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation
cases already discussed, the defendants were successful in removing the
suits from state courts to U.S. District Courts.1 60 There was, however,
one ex-POW who managed to argue in a California state court.16" ' While
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California held that
removal jurisdiction was proper,' 62 the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California, in a case regarding similar claims based on the
same 1999 California state statute, 163 denied that such removal jurisdic-
tion would be necessary and left the case to the California state courts.
64
In a California state court, the law allowing the reparations suit
overcame a challenge based on the United States Constitution and the
plaintiff was permitted to advance his claims. 165 The defendant, a large
Japanese Cement Company that allegedly enslaved the plaintiff during
World War II, appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal in the 2 nd
District of California.166 On January 15, 2003, the Court of Appeal af-
firmed the decision of the trial court, rejecting the claim that the 1951
Peace Treaty barred the suit and discarding the notion that the California
statute infringed on the federal government's foreign affairs power.'
67
While Jeong, the state court plaintiff, was a civilian internee during
the war rather than a prisoner-of-war, the cases all challenged the validity
of the same 1999 California statute. 168  Thus, while the 1951 Peace
Treaty may not influence the court in the same way in each suit,16 9 the
160. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
161. Robert Jablon, Law Upheld Allowing WWII Slave-Labor Lawsuits, THE SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Jan. 16, 2003 [hereinafter "Law Upheld'].
162. See, generally, In Re World War I1 Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 164
F.Supp.2d 1153, 164 F.Supp.2d 1160, 114 F.Supp.2d 939.
163. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 354.6 (1999).
164. Jeong v. Onada Cement Co. Ltd., No. CV 99-11092, slip-op. (C.D. Cal. May 17,
2000).
165. Law Upheld, supra note 161.
166. Id.
167. Taiheiyo Cement Corp. v. Superior Court, 105 Cal.App.4 h 398, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d
451 (Cal. App. 2003).
168. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.6 (1999).
169. The appellate court noted that the 1951 Peace Treaty did not expressly or impli-
edly bar or preempt claims by Korean nationals, such as Jeong, against Japanese corpora-
tions for events occurring during World War II. Taiheiyo Cement Corp. v. Superior
Court, 105 Cal.App.4 th 398, 409.
2003]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
constitutional analysis of the law should remain uniform regardless of the
circumstances under which the particular plaintiff was enslaved. Much
like the federal system, the state court was confronted with arguments
from the intervening federal government that the suit should be dis-
missed, 7 ° but unlike the cases in the federal system, the state court man-
aged to view the arguments with the clarity they deserved and evaluated
the merits of the case rather than the possible consequences of upholding
the law.
IV. Implications of the 9 th Circuit's Decision to Deny Reparations.
When World War II was in its early stages, young Americans were
sent into combat to ensure the future of the United States. Many of those
individuals had chosen to serve out of a desire to protect their families
and their country, without knowing where the war might take them. 7'
Little did these soldiers know that they would be enslaved by the large
corporations of the nation that took them captive during the war. This
fact alone is sufficient to make many possible soldiers reconsider their
decision. When prospective soldiers are deciding whether to join the
armed forces, word of the court's decision to deny the POWs the right to
seek reparations will curb their enthusiasm. It is more difficult to pledge
your allegiance to a nation, and to a government, who will not stand be-
hind you in your time of need.
Dr. Lester I. Tenney, one of the thousands of soldiers captured at
Bataan, argued before Congress that the decision to deny reparations
would drastically reduce enlistment figures in the armed forces. 172 Dr.
Tenney, who argued that the legislation permitting ex-POWs to seek
compensation should be passed, explained that when a young man or
woman enlists in the armed forces, there is an "implied promise that for
what they give, they will never be forgotten.' ' 173 Here, the denial of repa-
rations demonstrates an unequivocal breach of this implied promise. Our
veterans, those who fought for the country yesterday, are struggling
against the government of the United States which is helping wealthy
Japanese Corporations escape liability. And the impact of the denial of
reparations is reaching and affecting those young men and women who
170, Law Upheld, supra note 161.
171. Letters to the Editor: Public Forum Hard Work, Los ANGELES DAILY NEWS,
Dec. 11, 2002 (letter from Henry P. Terusa of Burbank, California).
172. Right of World War I POWs to Sue for Wages: Remarks by Dr. Lester L Tenney,
Former POW of Japan Before the House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Immi-
gration and Claims, 10 7 h Cong. (Sept. 25, 2002) (remarks by Dr. Lester I. Tenney, for-
mer POW of Japan).
173. Id.
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are currently entering the ranks, those who will fight for the country to-
morrow. Dr. Tenney asked Congress, "What message is being sent to
our young people as they learn that the same leaders who are sending
them to faraway lands are denying us the right to pursue our claims?
' 174
Congress, by failing to enact legislation allowing ex-prisoners to sue
those who held them captive during World War II, has refused to answer
that question.
V. How to Solve the Problem: Plausible Possibilities for the Future.
A. Allow the Suits: If the U.S. Government Were to Simply Allow the
Suits, the Ex-PO Ws Would Have an Avenue for Relief
With clear evidence that Article 26 of the 1951 Peace Treaty has
been invoked by Japan's numerous other agreements, one solution to this
entire debate is for the government of the United States to discontinue its
efforts at intervening in such suits. This would allow the ex-POWs to
present their cases in court, free of influence from the federal govern-
ment. Otherwise, our nation's veterans will continue to be denied the ba-
sic right that has been awarded to citizens of Denmark and the Soviet
Union by their respective treaties with Japan.17 5 If the federal govern-
ment were prohibited, either by statute or simply as a matter of policy,
from intervening in the suits brought by ex-prisoners against the Japa-
nese, the POWs would finally be given a fair opportunity to voice their
positions and have their cases heard.
B. Set up a Reparations Fund: The U.S. Government Could Simply
Use the Money Left-Over from the Liquidation of Japanese Assets to
Set- Up a Fund From Which Ex-PO Ws Could Obtain Reparations.
The baffling fact still lurking is that the U.S. government has failed
to account for the money not paid out to forced labor victims following
World War II. With as much as $3,858,048,508 still unaccounted for, it
is clear that there are funds available for compensating the ex-POWs.
176
Why the government would intervene in lawsuits to prevent the soldiers
from seeking reparations is beyond comprehension, especially when the
money for reparations is in Uncle Sam's back pocket. Distributing the
money to claimants would result in the U.S. government spending only
the money received for such a purpose, and the ex-POWs would have the
174. Id.
175. See Sec. IlI(A)(1).
176. See Sec. 1(F); Right of World War II POWs to Sue for Wages, Testimony of
Robert D. McCallum, Assistant Attorney General, supra note 87.
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sense of closure that they seek by filing such reparations suits. To allow
the government to keep the money for itself would be to financially re-
ward the government of the United States for not giving the money to the
soldiers. This flies in the face of the 1951 Peace Treaty which specifi-
cally transferred the Japanese property to the U.S. so that it could be liq-
uidated to pay such reparations. 
77
The example set by the Australian government' 78 should be care-
fully considered by the United States. Even though the Australian gov-
ernment determined that the 1951 Peace Treaty precluded the payment of
reparations, 79 the fact that the nation's citizens were left without such
payment was unacceptable to Australia. 180 As one of the countries sign-
ing the 1951 Treaty, Australia, like the U.S., was entitled to liquidate
Japanese property in order to pay reparations. 8 ' Thus, when Australian
citizens held captive by the Japanese during the war sought reparations,
despite the fact that it was approximately fifty years after the forced labor
took place,82 Australia found a way to pay reparations without regard to
the possible implications to Australian international relations. The
United States should take notice of the method demonstrated by Austra-
lia and allow the ex-POWs to at least seek reparations from a U.S. gov-
ernment-established fund.
C. Give the Money to a Non-Profit Organization: The United States
has Several Organizations, Dedicated to Serving the Interests of
Veterans and Prisoners of War, that are Uniquely Qualified to
Assist the Government in Distributing the Left-Over Money to Those
Held Captive During WWII.
In 1942, as word spread that American soldiers had been captured
on the Bataan Peninsula and were being held captive by the Japanese
government, concerned relatives and other citizens back home began
meeting to discuss the conditions facing their family and friends in the
Japanese prison camps. 183 These gatherings paved the way for the estab-
lishment of the American Ex-POWs Association, Inc., which exists "to
177. Peace Treaty, supra note 44, at ch. 7, art. 26.
178. Australian POWs Welcome Compensation, supra note 144; see Sec. III(A)(3).
179. Australian POWs Welcome Compensation, supra note 144; see Sec. Ill(A)(3).
180. Australian POWs Welcome Compensation, supra note 144.
181. See Peace Treaty, supra note 44.
182. Australian POWs Welcome Compensation, supra note 144.
183. American Ex-Prisoners of War homepage, at http://www.axpow.org (last visited
May 11, 2003).
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help those who cannot help themselves."'1 84 Such an organization is cer-
tainly concerned when the United States thrusts itself into reparations
suits and prevents the ex-POWs from helping themselves. The American
Ex-Prisoners of War, however, "does not have the resources to locate ex-
prisoners, let alone their heirs." 185 Thus, while the organization is de-
signed to help ex-POWs "deal with the trauma through friendship of
those who shared a common experience, ' 86 it is "not structured to either
accept or disburse funds" under such a program of distribution.' 87
Another organization paying close attention to the reparations suits
is the Center for Internee Rights, Inc. ("the Center"), which was estab-
lished in 1990.188 The Center is primarily concerned with obtaining an
apology and reparations for POWs that were subjected to the atrocities
committed by the empire of Japan during World War 11.189 In order to
address these concerns, the Center has been actively involved in lawsuits
filed in Tokyo pursuing reparations that have risen to the Japanese Ap-
pellate Court, 90 some of which have reached the Japanese Supreme
Court. This is simply another example of an organization that is both
willing and able to work with the U.S. government and other organiza-
tions to help ex-prisoners obtain reparations, from either the Japanese
government or the United States government, from an escrow account or
other fund set up for the victims of Japan's wartime atrocities.'
9'
If the U.S. government were to part with the money left over from
184. Id.
185. Email Correspondence with Pete Wygle, Chairman of the Civilian Internee
Committee of the American Ex-Prisoners of War. (Jan. 3, 2003) (on file with author)
[hereinafter "Email Correspondence with Pete Wygle"]. Mr. Wygle was captured by the
Japanese in January, 1942, and placed in an internment camp where he remained for over
3 years. Upon release, Mr. Wygle graduated from the University of California, Berkeley
and became Chairman of the Civilian Internee Committee in 1995. See Ex-POW Biogra-
phy: Pete Wygle, at http://www.axpow.org/wyglepeter.htm (last visited May 11, 2003).
186. American Ex-Prisoners of War homepage, at http://www.axpow.org (last visited
May 11, 2003), supra note 183.
187. Email Correspondence with Pete Wygle, supra note 185.
188. The Center for Internee Rights, Inc. homepage, at http://www.expows.com (last
visited May 11, 2003), supra note 66.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Telephone Interview with Gil Hair, Executive Director of the Center for Internee
Rights, Inc., in Miami Beach, Florida (December 28, 2002). Mr. Hair has been actively
involved in seeking reparations for ex-POWs that have not been compensated for the
time they spent as forced labor in Japan during World War II, working in conjunction
with numerous law firms to bring suits in the United States and Japan against the U.S.
government and the Japanese government. Mr. Hair, on behalf of the Center, indicated a
reluctance to be directly involved in the actual payment of reparations, but expressed an
overwhelming willingness to work in conjunction with other organizations, by providing
necessary data and records for the most judicious distribution possible, in order to ensure
that all ex-prisoners entitled to reparations would be able to receive compensation from
the account. Id.
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the liquidation of Japanese assets, between $86,798,508 and
$3,858,048,508,192 these non-profit organizations 193 could assist in the
distribution of the funds to the ex-prisoners and/or their heirs. This
would satisfy the vast majority of the POWs and they would then be
barred from filing reparations suits, because they would have already re-
ceived reparations payments. But in this case, so far, rather than paying
reparations, or even allowing the prisoners to seek such reparations from
Japanese Corporations, the United States government is essentially using
the funds left over from liquidation of Japanese assets to intervene in
lawsuits filed by POWs and destroy the war heroes' chances of receiving
compensation.
VI. Conclusion
In 1951, the United States signed a treaty with Japan which stated
that reparations should by paid by Japan, but the treaty called for the Al-
lied Powers to waive such reparations because Japan's resources were
not sufficient, at the time, to make such payments while maintaining a
viable economy. 94 Now, fifty years later, the resources of Japan are
more than sufficient, 195 yet the government of the United States refuses
to allow ex-prisoners to seek compensation, a right that the U.S. govern-
ment claims it gave away in the Peace Treaty. It cannot be denied that a
problem exists, and we as a nation, on behalf of our veterans, are in des-
perate need of a solution.
The need for reparations, and the denial of the ability to seek such
compensation, has caused some of the soldiers who once put their lives
on the line in defense of the United States, to turn their backs on their
country, after the U.S. government turned its back on them. One ex-
POW displayed his dismay with the governments' decision to intervene
in reparations suits by declaring his disgust: "I hate our government's
guts, personally."'
' 96
192. The FCSC contends that the amount received from the sale of Japanese assets
was only $228,750,000. See, e.g., War Claims and Enemy Property Legislation, State-
ments by Whitney Gillilland, then head of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission,
supra note 104. But others argue that the amount realized from the liquidation of seized
Japanese assets was actually $4 billion. See, e.g., Right of World War H PO Ws to Sue for
Wages, Testimony of Robert D. McCallum, Assistant Attorney General, supra note 87.
These two amounts, minus the $141,952,492 allegedly paid by the FCSC, result in the
figures listed as left-over from the liquidation of Japanese assets but not paid as repara-
tions to the ex-POWs. See 1998 FCSC Report, supra note 118.
193. See American Ex-Prisoners of War homepage, at http://www.axpow.org (last
visited May 11, 2003), supra note 183; The Center for Internee Rights, Inc. homepage, at
http://www.expows.com (last visited May 11, 2003), supra note 66.
194. Peace Treaty, supra note 44, at ch. 5, art. 14(a).
195. The World 50 Years Later, supra note 59.
196. Ex-POWs Fight for Right to Sue Japanese Companies, supra note 102.
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Inside the courtroom, the worst thing the United States government
can do is take action. They have intervened in lawsuits, in which they
are not a party, claiming that the 1951 Peace Treaty disallowed private
citizens from suing Japanese Corporations. The government is wasting
time and money, all in an effort to fight those that served in the armed
forces and suffered on behalf of the U.S. government. Outside of the
courtroom, the worst course of action for the government is inaction. By
doing nothing, failing to pass legislation, and threatening reparations
bills with presidential vetoes, the U.S. government defies these ex-POWs
in an unimaginable way. The government whose interests were heroi-
cally served during World War II is now refusing to serve the interests of
those soldiers.
When the United States was attacked by Japan at Pearl Harbor,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt addressed the nation, and promised that
"no matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated inva-
sion, the American people in their righteous might will win through to
absolute victory." 197 But for thousands of soldiers taken captive during
World War II on the Bataan Peninsula, who still fight to this very day to
win a war of reparations against Japan and the United States, "absolute
victory" is still merely a dream. We, as a nation, may have won the war,
but many Americans are still losing battles everyday. This is not the
"absolute victory" that was promised to us after the attack at Pearl Har-
bor and something must be done to assure that these war heroes do not
die without the victory they were promised.
In closing, all readers should take a moment and put themselves in
the place of the ex-prisoners who had their freedom stripped away by the
Japanese government and large powerful Japanese Corporations during
World War II. Imagine being denied compensation, not unsurprisingly,
by the government that used you as forced labor for years. Then imagine
coming home to the nation you served, only to have another door
slammed shut in your face as you are again denied reparations, this time
by your own government. Something must be done to provide these he-
roes with the recourse they seek. The U.S. government must realize that
any effort to remedy this problem will benefit not only the ex-POWs, but
the United States government itself, both as a democracy, and as a col-
lective voice for all Americans. "Our honor as a nation depends on us
all."'
98
197. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's address to the Congress of the United States
on December 8, 1941, available at http://www.frontiemet.net/-pendino/WW-Two-
History.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2003).
198. Quote from the POW/MIA Freedom Fighters homepage, at
http://www.powmiaff.org (last visited Apr. 5, 2003).
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